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ADVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONTRACT 
John Linarelli 
Conjectures are of great importance since they suggest useful lines of research. – Alan Tu-
ring1  
Abstract 
The aim of this article is to inquire whether contract law can operate in a state 
of affairs in which artificial general intelligence (AGI) exists and has the cog-
nitive abilities to interact with humans to exchange promises or otherwise en-
gage in the sorts of exchanges typically governed by contract law. AGI is a 
long way off but its emergence may be sudden and come in the lifetimes of 
some people alive today. How might contract law adapt to a situation in which 
at least one of the contract parties could, from the standpoint of capacity to 
engage in promising and exchange, be an AGI? This is not a situation in which 
AI operates as an agent of a human or a firm, a frequent occurrence right now. 
Rather, the question is whether an AGI could constitute a principal – a contract 
party on its own. Contract law is a good place to start a discussion about adapt-
ing the law for an AGI future because it already incorporates a version of what 
is known as weak AI in its objective standard for contract formation and inter-
pretation. Contract law in some limited sense takes on issues of relevance from 
philosophy of mind. AGI holds the potential to transform a solution to an epis-
temological problem of how to prove a contract exists into solution to an onto-
logical problem about the capacity to contract. An objection might be that con-
tract law presupposes the existence of a person the law recognizes as pos-
sessing the capacity to contract. Contract law itself may not be able to answer 
the prior question of legally recognized personhood. The answer will be to fo-
cus on how AGI cognitive architecture could be designed for compatibility for 
human interaction. This article focuses on that question as well. 
INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence (AI) will bring about the next big change in the law. It will com-
pel us to reconsider who or what will be the subjects upon which the law imposes duties, 
confers powers, and allocates rights. AI already challenges the allocation of legal du-
ties, powers, and rights to persons already recognized as subjects of the law. But the 
challenge to-date has been incremental. The next big change will be transformational. 
It will be more significant than the legal recognition of the limited liability firm, the last 
 Professor of Commercial Law, Durham University Law School. 
1 Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 Mind 433, 442 (1950). 
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great move in legal systems to alter who (or more precisely what) gets legal rights and 
bears liabilities.2 An artificial person with limited liability such as a corporation still 
must operate through human agents,3 though American law may permit an automated 
system to operate but not create a member-less limited liability company.4 A suffi-
ciently advanced AI, a so-called artificial general intelligence (AGI) will not need to 
operate through agents. In the study of the history of science we are admonished to 
avoid extending Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm shift beyond its intended pur-
poses.5 It may be no exaggeration to apply the notion of the paradigm shift here to argue 
that the next big change in the law to accommodate AGI will not be normal legal 
change. 
We do not know where advances in AI are headed. AGI does not yet exist. AI cur-
rently falls short of human capabilities generally though AI already outperforms human 
intelligence in many specific domains.6 The Stanford study, Artificial Intelligence and 
Life in 2030, states that to date, “no machines with self-sustaining long-term goals and 
intent have been developed, nor are they likely to be developed in the near future.”7 But 
AGI will come to exist in the future. Claims that AGI could never exist are implausible. 
To base predictions on the current state of AI technology would not be rational. To hold 
2 See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLU-
TIONARY IDEA (2005); Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the 
Firm 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2005).  
3 Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of Humans (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 27/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941001; Scott Bayern, Thomas Burri, Thomas D. Grant, 
Daniel M. Häusermann, Florian Möslein & Richard Williams, Company Law and Autonomous Systems: 
A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 135 (2017). 
4 Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous 
Systems, 7 EUR. J. RISK REG. 297 (2016); Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business Entity 
Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 104 (2015); Scott Bayern, 
Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 
1496-97 (2014). For concern about threats to humanity from entities controlled by AI, see Lynn M. 
Lopucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2018). 
5 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
6 NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 14 (2014). But certainly not in 
all areas. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law 89 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2014).  
7 PETER STONE ET AL., STANFORD UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030: REPORT OF THE
2015 STUDY PANE 4 (2016). 
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predictions hostage to some presupposed uniqueness of human understanding or con-
sciousness is unsupportable.8 Nick Bostrom tentatively predicts the existence of human 
level AI by mid-century and soon thereafter a super-AI vastly exceeding the cognitive 
abilities of humans.9 
And we do not know of the progress AI itself will make in advancing towards AGI. 
It is possible that the basic components of AI cognitive architecture (code or otherwise) 
will become something roughly analogous to “gene” and AI evolution will occur inde-
pendently of the initial human intervention of AI creation, if humans engineer such 
evolution to be possible. Machine learning already accomplishes this in limited do-
mains.10  
The aim of this article is to assess the feasibility of investing an AGI, from a legal 
point of view, with the power to enter into contracts, either with humans or with other 
AGIs. The argument made in this article is that an AGI can be a party to a contract. It 
can be legally obligated for promises it makes in contracts, have and enforce rights as 
a matter of contract, and bear contractual liabilities. Part of the answer rests on contract 
law itself and part rests on the need to design AGI cognition to be compatible with the 
8 A longstanding disagreement in philosophy of mind is between those who argue that AI, or at least 
what is known as strong AI, is impossible. Strong AI is AI that actually thinks, is conscious, has a phe-
nomenology of the particular experiences of life, and has the properties of intentionality that humans 
have. Weak AI is AI that acts as if it is thinking, conscious, and acting with intentionality. See STUART 
RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 1020-1033 (3d ed. 
2010)(overview). While staking out a middle ground David Chalmers offers a good summary of the 
arguments. DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH 6OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 313-
332 (1996). This is an argument about whether AI must have some form of inner life, some phenome-
nology of conscious experience, or true understanding or whether a simulation of these things will suf-
fice, is beyond our scope here. This article rests on the argument that weak AI is sufficient for contracting 
and so no need exists to engage in this debate. AI researchers take a similar view and go further, arguing 
that philosophers are asking the wrong questions that are too open ended for science. The argue, for 
example, that asking whether AI has consciousness is akin to asking if aircraft can fly because they are 
not birds or asking whether submarines can swim because they are not fish. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra, 
at 1021. 
9 BOSTROM, supra note xx, at 24-25. 
10 See supra note xx and accompanying text.  
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requirements of contract law and the properties of exchange in social and market con-
texts. 
At the outset, distinguish contracts with and by AGIs from smart contracts. This 
article does not deal with smart contracting. The term “smart contract” is ambiguous.11 
It is not a legal concept. Very simply, a smart contract is a contract (a legally enforce-
able agreement) for which some or all contract performance is executed and enforced 
digitally and without the need for human intervention except at the level of writing code 
to automate contract performance.12 Distributed ledger technology has advanced sub-
stantially the ability of contract parties to write and use smart contracts. The combina-
tion of the distributed ledger, the network, and the consensus mechanisms built into 
distributed ledger technology facilitate trust between contract parties and replace hu-
mans in institutions operating as intermediaries.13 In short, smart contracts substitute 
algorithmic for human contract performance and enforcement. The next-generation 
conceptualization of smart contracts might be as “algorithmic” contracts in which al-
gorithms operate constructively as agents for humans.14 A more general notion is Scott 
Bayern’s process-agreement equivalence principle: “at least as a matter of conceptual 
logic, a legally enforceable agreement may give legal significance to arbitrary features 
11 Harry Surden has developed a typology to clarify the evolution and categories of smart contracting. 
He classifies the evolution of digitized agreements, starting with online contracts, moving to data-ori-
ented contracts that specify obligations in code, and then on to computable contracts that assess contract 
performance and produce consequences. Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
629, 631-42 (2012).  He developed this typology before the rise of blockchain. Kevin Werbach & Nich-
olas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 101, 108-112 (2017). 
12 Various authors have offered definitions of a smart contract. Nick Szabo is credited with inventing the 
phrase. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9 at 107. Szabo defines a smart contract as a “set of promises, 
specified in digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on these promises.” Nick 
Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets (1996), available at 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinter-
school2006/szabo.best.vwh net/smart_contracts_2 html (accessed Feb. 7, 2019). Max Raskin describes 
smart contracts as “agreements wherein execution is automated, usually by computers.” Max Raskin, 
The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 306 (2017); Werbach & Cornell 
define a smart contract as an “agreement in digital form that is self-executing and self-enforcing.” Wer-
bach & Cornell, supra note xx at 108. 
13 Werbach & Cornell, supra note xx at 118. 
14 Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128 (2017). 
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of the state of any process (such as an algorithm or physical system) by specifying legal 
conditions satisfied by features of that state.”15  
Smart contracts are in widespread use now and their use is increasing. An example 
of a smart contract is Fizzy, the automated flight delay insurance system used by the 
French airline AXA, running on the Ethereum blockchain. Fizzy allows passengers to 
be indemnified for late fight arrivals as soon as they arrive at their destination. Passen-
gers need do nothing other than buy the insurance on the AXA app. With Fizzy, if a 
flight is more than two hours late, the passenger will receive an automatic notification 
with compensation options. The code sends the compensation directly to the bank or 
credit card the customer has chosen.16 Compare the Fizzy smart contract with the 
“dumb” contracts that train operators use in the United Kingdom.17 In the United King-
dom, the typical terms of the franchise by government to train operators requires the 
train operator to adhere to a passengers’ charter mandating passenger compensation for 
some train delays, depending on cause and duration. To claim compensation, passengers 
must enter details online along with a readable scan of their paper tickets or mail the 
tickets along with a form completed by hand. Train operators promise compensation in 
28 days. Train passengers must endure this process even though the train operators have 
in their computer systems all the information they need about passengers and delays. 
The difference between contracting with or by an AGI and smart (or algorithmic) 
contracts is that humans or legal persons in the form of entities such as corporations are 
the actual parties to smart contracts, whereas contracts with AGIs involve at least one 
15 Bayern, supra note xx, at 300; Bayern, Burri et al., supra note 2, at 136. On the limits of smart con-
tracts, see Werbach & Cornell, supra note xx; Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of 
Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (2017). 
16 AXA Goes Blockchain with Fizzy, https://www.axa.com/en/newsroom/news/axa-goes-blockchain-
with-fizzy (accessed Feb. 8, 2019). 
17  See, e.g., Great Western Railway, Passenger’s Charter, https://www.gwr.com/about-us/our-busi-
ness/passengers-charter (accessed Feb. 8, 2019). See also Jeffrey Lipshaw. The Persistence of “Dumb” 
Contracts, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1 (2019). 
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contract party that is neither a human nor a currently recognized legal person such as a 
corporation, limited liability company, or partnership. This difference is fundamental. 
This article examines what it might mean for contract law when AI is sufficiently ad-
vanced that it could have the capacity, in a cognitive sense, to make and perform con-
tracts. 
 This article is organized as follows. Part I examines how contract law, already at 
least partly and with some adaptation, has answered the question of how to treat an AGI 
as a contract party. The objective theory of contract, prevalent in American and English 
common law, informs us that in determining whether a contract came into existence 
and what its terms might be, courts do not inquire whether persons in their minds actu-
ally possessed intent to be bound in contract, but look to external evidence in the form 
of an outward manifestation of assent by words, behavior, and action. The objective 
theory coincides closely to the Turing test for assessing whether an AI exists. The Tu-
ring test requires an evaluator to evaluate text-based communications between a human 
and a machine and if the evaluator cannot reliably predict who is human and what is 
machine, then the machine has passed the test. The subjective-objective debate in the 
common law of contract, long settled in favor of the objective standard, reflects with 
remarkable consistency debates among philosophers and AI researchers on how to as-
sess intentions of AI and test whether AI could plausibly have consciousness. That the 
objective theory of contract may be meant to deal with an epistemological problem, that 
of determining whether a contract has come into existence, and not an ontological prob-
lem, that of determining whether the actors who are attempting to contract are eligible 
as persons to be bound by the law, does not pose an obstacle to using the theory to 
support recognition of an AGI as a contract party. Part II addresses how to design an 
AGI to allow it to interact with humans in the domain of contract. This is a question of 
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how to code the cognitive architecture of AGI. Part II does not argue that AI researchers 
must replicate or copy humans for the sake of doing so, if that will ever be possible. 
Rather, the focus should be on interactivity and cognition associated with transacting 
and exchange. Because contract law evolved as a social institution to enforce group 
norms for humans and reflects normative concepts found in human cognition, any AGI, 
to form contracts with humans, will have to possess some cognitive adaptations that 
support exchange-level interactions of a contractual kind with humans. Developing 
AGIs as contractors is a demanding task, and while the investigation of these questions 
is speculative at this point, it might be an eminently practical sooner than we think. 
I. THE TURING TEST ALREADY IN CONTRACT LAW
In his 1950 article, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Turing starts by stating his 
question as “can machines think?”18 He eventually finds this question “too meaningless 
to deserve discussion”19 and replaces it with “are there any imaginable digital comput-
ers which would do well in the imitation game?”20 The imitation game proceeds as 
follows. The players in the game are a human being and a machine. The game also 
includes a human interrogator. The interrogator is in a separate room from the human 
and the machine. The interrogator knows the others are labelled X and Y, knows one is 
human and the other machine, but does not know which. The object of the game is to 
test whether the interrogator can tell the difference between the human and the machine 
though a series of questions. The interrogator is to ask questions to the machine and the 
individual through a text channel to avoid revealing which is the human and which the 
machine. If the interrogator cannot reliably distinguish the human from the machine, 
18 Turing, supra note 1. 
19 Id., 442. 
20 Id. 
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then the machine passes the test. The test is meant to assess whether a machine can give 
answers that consistently resemble those a human would give such that humans cannot 
tell the machine apart from a human, in terms of the cognitive performance of the ma-
chine.21    
There has been much debate about what the Turing test tells us. Turing offered his 
test at a time when behaviorism was ascendant in psychology, and cognitive science, a 
field closely aligned with artificial intelligence and focusing on mental representations 
and not only on behavior, was only beginning to emerge as a field of study.22 Gilbert 
Ryle’s, The Concept of Mind, a thorough rejection of Cartesian dualism, was published 
a year before Turing’s paper.23 While Ryle said that his work was limited to rejecting 
mind-body dualism as it is understood in philosophy, he did point out that a methodo-
logical problem with psychology before behaviorism was that “the reputed deliverances 
of consciousness and introspection are not publicly checkable.”24 
AI definitions vary based on whether to focus on behavior and action or on whether 
machines actually think.25 Turing focused on the former. His test is now understood as 
a way to look for “weak AI,” enough for classifying a machine as an AI if the machine 
can act as if it is thinking and has intentionality.26 Distinguish strong AI: for a machine 
to qualify as intelligent in a strong AI sense, it actually has to think and have actual 
intentions associated with its actions and not just simulate thinking and intentions.27 In 
21 See Stevan Harnad, The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific Crite-
rion, 3 SIGART BULLETIN 9 (1992). 
22 The first academic gathering that got cognitive science as a discipline started was the Hixon sympo-
sium, “Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior,” held at the California Institute of Technology in 1948. HOW-
ARD GARDNER, THE MIND’S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION 10 (1985).  
23 GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949). 
24 Id., 327. 
25 Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1, 1020. See also note __ and accompanying text.   
26 Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1, 1020; WENDALL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MA-
CHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 74-75 (2010). 
27 Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1026-27; Wallach & Allen, supra note xx, at 74-75; John Searle, 
Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 THE BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 417 (1980). 
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other words,  strong AI posits the notion that a machine has a “mind” that can under-
stand and have mental states just like humans. AI researchers do not care about these 
distinctions and accept weak AI as sufficient to determine whether machine intelligence 
can be classified as AI.28  
Weak AI is sufficient for purposes of determining whether an AGI could be a party 
to a contract, in terms of understanding the question as one internal to contract law. The 
Turing test has been effectively embedded into Anglo-American contract law, in the 
objective theory of contract.29 The focus of this tradition in contract law is on outward 
appearances – on what can be proven as a matter of evidence independent of the mental 
states the parties may or may not have. The objective theory of contract tells us that 
intention to be bound to or form a contract is determined by evidence external to the 
actual intentions of the parties. Judge Learned Hand has said: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or in-
dividual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the 
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which 
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were 
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, in-
tended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes 
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mis-
take, or something else of the sort.30 
Judge Frank Easterbrook has explained that intention to be bound “does not invite a 
tour through [a contract party’s] cranium” but must necessarily be derived from a con-
sideration of the words, written and oral, and actions of the part parties.31 Often quoted 
28 Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1020. Searle, widely known as an avid critic of the notion of the 
possibility of AI, seems only to object to the possibility of strong AI. Searle, supra note xx, at 417. 
29 See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contact Formation and Interpretation, 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000); Timothy A. O. Endicott, Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete 
Agreements, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE FOURTH SERIES 151 (Jeremey Horder ed., 2000).  
30 Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), 
aff’d, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). 
31 Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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on the objective theory of contract formation and interpretation is the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court, itself quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.: 
A contract involves what is called a meeting of the minds of the parties. 
But this does not mean that they must have arrived at a common mental 
state touching the matter at hand. The standard by which their conduct 
is judged and their rights are limited are not internal but external. In the 
absence of fraud or incapacity, the question is: What did the party say 
and do? “The making of a contract does not depend upon the state of the 
parties’ minds; it depends upon their overt acts.”32  
The U.S. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, intended to reflect a consensus about 
contract law in the United States, does not contain any section explicitly titled on in-
tention to form a contract. It advises us that American contract law has likely abolished 
the idea of intention to be legally bound. Restatement (Second) section 21 provides that 
“neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the 
formation of a contract. . . .”33 American contract law instead relies on what is known 
in American law as manifestation of mutual assent, which requires each party either to 
promise, objectively understood, or perform.34 While English law does not reflect this 
Restatement (Second) language of manifestation of mutual assent, it is substantially 
similar in adhering to an objective theory of contract formation and interpretation.35 In 
English law, intention to create legal relations is traditionally only used to distinguish 
promises the parties want the law to enforce and promises they do not want the law to 
enforce. 
32 Woburn National Bank v Woods, 77 N.H. 172, 89 A 491, 492 (1914)(citation omitted), quoting OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 307 (1881). 
33 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §21 (1981). 
34 Id., §18. The “manifestation” language is pervasive in American contract law and reflects the notion 
of contracting making sense only in the form or external representations to other persons. See, e.g., Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts §2 (1981), which defines core concepts such as a promise as “a mani-
festation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made.” Comment b explains that a manifestation of intention 
is an “external expression” as opposed to “undisclosed intention.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §2 
cmt. b (1981). 
35 Endicott, supra note xx; EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT 1 (14th ed., 2015)(§1-002, 
‘The objective principle”)..  
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No “Chinese room” problem confronts the thin version of intentionality in Ameri-
can and English contract law. The philosopher John Searle posed the Chinese room 
problem, a thought experiment36 to argue that strong AI is impossible. In summary form 
the Chinese room problem proceeds as follows. Imagine yourself alone in a room fol-
lowing a set of rules in English, a language you understand, responding to Mandarin 
Chinese characters slipped under the door. You understand no Mandarin, but you are 
following the rules provided to you, analogous to a computer program, to produce ap-
propriate responses in the form of Mandarin Chinese characters to questions posed in 
Mandarin Chinese to you under the door. You can do this to an adequate level of pro-
ficiency that you fool the person on the other side of the door into believing that you 
actually know Mandarin Chinese. The thought experiment is designed to show that pro-
gramming a machine might make the machine appear to understand a language, but it 
does not actually understand the language. Searle argues that the thought experiment 
illustrates that computers only use syntactic rules to manipulate symbol strings but have 
no understanding of the meaning or semantics of those symbols. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the Chinese room problem that go far be-
yond our scope here.37 For our purposes the Chinese room problem is useful in helping 
us understand why weak AI just might be enough for contract formation and interpre-
tation. Think about how the common law of contract does not recognize a “secret” in-
tent to form a contract or not to form a contract, or for a particular provision to be or 
not to be in a contract. Contract law does not make mental states or “mind” relevant. 
Simulating “real” intent does not matter to contract law. Analogizing to the Chinese 
36 On the use of thought experiments in philosophy see Kimberly Brownlee & Zofia Stemplowska, 
Thought Experiments, in METHODS IN ANALYTICAL POLITICAL THEORY 21 (Adran Blau ed., 2017) 
37 For an extended discussion, see David Cole, The Chinese Room Problem, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/#toc 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
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room thought experiment, the symbols that come out of the room matter for contracting, 
regardless of how they are produced. The semantics of contract terms does not rely on 
any “true” understanding, in terms of what the parties actually mean, but only what 
their actions or outward appearances convey what they mean. This is weak AI. The law 
of contracts only recognizes weak forms of intelligence, natural or artificial. Simulated 
or real, whatever that may mean in the study of consciousness and the mind, are simply 
irrelevant to contract law. 
The argument for recognition of AGI as a potential contracting party using the ob-
jective theory of contract is not an extension of objective theory beyond its purposes. 
A possible objection to the argument, which would ultimately prove unsuccessful, 
might proceed along the following lines. The objective theory of contract is meant to 
be epistemological and not ontological. Objectivity in contract law is meant to solve 
problems of proof and evidence. It is about providing tractable means by which to prove 
to a fact-finder (a judge or a jury) whether the parties formed a contract and on what 
terms.38 My argument, so the objection goes, attempts to answer a prior question, about 
the nature of the contract parties themselves, about who can be said to qualify by law 
to form an intent in the first place. These questions will be taken up in part II below in 
a more policy-oriented sense, but this part will address it from the internal perspective 
of the objective theory of contract itself. 
The objective theory of contract is more than about what one can prove in court. It 
is not a set of propositions from the law of evidence but a set of propositions about the 
concepts or properties of contract. Objectivity goes to a claim that differs from how to 
prove. It goes to whether a contract exists, or not. Nothing about contract law is first 
person or phenomenological. Its doctrines are functional. Contract law does not care 
38 See Perillo, supra note xx. 
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about the nature of the cognitive systems of a contracting party but how they function. 
If an intelligence is capable of manifesting to the external world that it can promise, 
bargain, and discharge contractual rights and obligations, then its outward appearances 
in the form of objective evidence is not subject to refutation, as a matter of contract 
law.39  
We see the focus on function in the law on capacity to contract. Relying on exist-
ing law risks anthropocentrism and setting an inappropriate standard, but given law’s 
emphasis on text, tradition, and precedent, let us give it a go. 
Preliminarily, avoid tautologies. It is true that capacity to contract can exist because 
the law makes it so. To rely on such a claim would be an exercise in empty formalism. 
It is equivalent to saying p because p. A stipulative approach works for delimiting ca-
pacity as it relates to the age of individuals and to artificial persons such as corporations. 
These persons derive their capacity to contract through statute or well-settled common 
law principles.40 Circular reasoning will not solve the problem. It may come to pass that 
AGI does receive statutory or even case law recognition as a person, but such recogni-
tion usually hinges on some deeper need or justification and that is what we explore 
here. 
The law on contractual capacity of natural persons does not depend on the “nature” 
or qualities of the person who is the contracting party, and so it is at best unclear why 
it should do so for AGI. There is scant recent common law on capacity and the subject 
39 See supra note xx. Very crudely, contract law could be said to support or be consistent with a func-
tionalist philosophy of mind. There are many approaches to functionalism, and it is hazardous to gener-
alize. The gist of functionalism is this: a mental state does not depend on its internal composition but on 
how it functions or the role it plays for agents. It does not matter whether the actual stuff making these 
functions happen is a biological brain of a primate or the silicon chips of a computer. For a prominent 
version of functionalism, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991); DANIEL C. DEN-
NETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1989).  
40 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §12 cmt. e (1981); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & ZACHARY WOLFE,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 220-27 (4th ed., 2018); ANDREW BURROUGHS, A RESTATEMENT OF THE
ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT 34 (2016). 
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is covered very briefly here.  American Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 15, 
entitled “Mental Illness or Defect,” is illustrative. It provides that a person with a mental 
illness or defect lacks the capacity to contract and incurs only voidable contractual du-
ties if she or he cannot “understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences 
of the transaction” or  cannot “act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction 
and the other party has reason to know of his condition.”41 Moreover, when the contract 
is fair in its terms and the other party does not know of the mental illness or defect of 
the other party, the power of avoidance terminates to the extent the contract is per-
formed or avoidance would be unjust because of changed circumstances.42 Comment c 
to Section 15 explains that to prove incapacity it is essential to prove “irrational or 
unintelligent behavior” and that “almost any conduct of the person may be relevant.”43 
These Restatement provisions illustrate that the law on incapacity to contract, consist-
ently with the objective theory of contract, embeds a Turing-like test in its terms. They 
illustrate how contact law relies only on the external appearance of capacity.44 The per-
son whose capacity is in issue must be unable to understand or act “in a reasonable 
manner” to put the other party on notice of the incapacity. It removes the availability 
of the incapacity defense in situations in which the other party does not know the inca-
pacity and the contract is basically fair and already performed. There is no mental state-
type of evaluation because such an approach has no place in contract law. Capacity has 
to do, at least partly, with the manifestation of assent to contract, which, as explained 
41 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §15(1) (1982). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. §15(2). 
44 Id., cmt. c. There seems to be some difference in English law, in which an individual lacks mental 
capacity if at the time of contracting she cannot decide for herself to enter the contract “because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain,” but this can be read as agnostic 
on the question of the relevance of mental states and this principle is qualified by the fact that English 
law seems to require that the other party actually know of the incapacity. BURROUGHS, supra note xx. 
So, English law requires both (i) incapacity of the contracting party and (ii) actual knowledge of that 
incapacity of the other contracting party. Knowledge must necessarily be obtained by external means. 
English contract law rests on objective theory.   
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above, is determined through observable behavior and action. The appearance of assent 
to the other party can be determinative in any case in which incapacity is asserted as a 
defense. 
In summary, nothing in contact law itself prevents an AGI from being a party to a 
contract. To the contrary, contract law supports AGI recognition as a contracting party. 
Of course, many practical difficulties will arise in cases in in which an AGI will purport 
to be a party to a contract but from the standpoint of contract law itself, any difficulties 
can be overcome. Putting doctrine into practice is often more difficult than conceptual-
izing how the law would address a particular social problem in theory. 
II. AGIS AS BEARERS OF CONTRACT RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
As explained above, a possible objection to the above argument for AGI capacity 
or eligibility as a contract party is that it is question begging or at the very least sets 
overly narrow parameters by focusing only on contract law and not on the necessary 
conditions for contract law to operate in the first place. The prior question, so the argu-
ment goes, is not about contract but about status, about the status of AGI as persons. 
Before we begin to talk about contracting by AGIs, we need to resolve whether an AGI 
is entitled to status or recognition as a person under the law. The preceding discussion 
assumes there is a candidate or subject who (or which) can have capacity to contract. 
This part will take up these broader and more policy-oriented questions. The focus will 
be on subjects who can possess contract rights and bear contract liability. 
At the outset, rule out “artefact” arguments against recognition of AGI as subjects 
of the law.45 That an AGI is not a natural person tells us nothing about legal status other 
45 See Stephen Wettig & Bernhard Zehendner, A Legal Analysis of Human and Electronic Agents, 12 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 111, 123-24 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial 
Intelligences, 70 N. C. L. REV. 12311276-1279 (1992). 
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than that the law should not recognize an AGI as a natural person. That an AGI is not 
a natural person in the form of a human does not lead to the conclusion that it is to have 
no legal status at all. The law recognizes many kinds of persons that are not natural 
persons. Humans create other persons with no biology but with legal recognition, such 
as corporations. Biology is an arbitrary feature that cannot pick out the necessary con-
ditions for personhood. In the future, some AGI may be biological in at least some or 
even its main features and humans may incorporate elements of machine intelligence 
into their brains and bodies.46  
That an AGI is created by humans does not lead to the conclusion that an AGI 
should have no legal status as a person under the law or subject to the law. Several 
defects are apparent in this “creation” argument. Humans are created by humans too. 
The theological argument that humans are created by God cannot work. The proximate 
creators of humans are other humans at the present time though this may change.47 
AGIs are also created by God because everything is ultimately God’s creation, if one 
accepts the teachings of mainstream religions. AGIs, moreover, will probably be able 
to create other AGIs in the future, as this is what being a general domain AI may entail. 
That AI is “coded” in the sense that their intelligence may derive from a form of 
programming does not matter either for purposes of legal recognition of the status of 
AGI as subjects to which the law makes authoritative pronouncements. Theory and 
evidence about evolution informs us that humans are coded too.48 The “technology” or 
46 This article focuses on machine intelligence. BOSTROM supra note xx at 26-62 examines the various 
potential paths to super-intelligence, including whole brain emulation, biological cognition, and brain-
computer interfaces.  
47 Solum supra note xx at 1278.  
48 Evolutionary approaches are influential and perhaps dominant in the study of human cognition. This 
article work investigates human thought in a legal context but a look at how it has developed in the 
context of moral cognition may be revealing. For an overview in the context of the study of morality, see 
MICHAEL TOMASELLO, A NATURAL HISTORY OF HUMAN MORALITY 137-142 (2016).  Wallach & Allen 
identify the differences in thinking about morality along the lines of top-down versus bottom-up. The 
top-down approach to understanding morality is the approach of traditional moral philosophy, focusing 
on its three branches of deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 
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source of intelligence or intentionality should not be determinative of legal status or 
recognition. 
But there is a human constraint on AGI recognition as a person for purposes of 
contract law. The constraint is not special to contract law, but contract law adds special 
elements to it. It derives from the proposition that law is what anthropologist Michael 
Tomasello characterizes as a “conventional cultural practice” that has evolved through 
time to reflect and enforce group social norms of a special kind.49 For the law to be 
applied to both humans and AGI on terms of equal respect for each, AGIs will have to 
possess or be able to simulate a collective intentionality that so far has been special to 
humans.50 In broad strokes and with some adaptation the argument proceeds as follows. 
Collective intentionality is necessary for the existence of conventional cultural practices 
such as law.51 Law does not simply operate on human cognition; it is also created by 
it.52 Humans have evolved so that their cognition includes substantial elements of 
group-mindedness and pro-sociality.53 These features of human cognition gave humans 
the ability to construct cultures common in their groups through conventions that in-
clude social norms and institutions such as law.54 Contract law, money, social norms 
on what constitutes fair exchange and the psychology of markets all play a role. It will 
xx at 83-97. The bottom-up approach to understanding morality is the work in psychology, anthropology, 
and socio-biology, using empirical and experimental methods to explain the cognitive structure of human 
thinking about morality. The jury is still out on the approach to morality programming for AI. The answer 
will likely be driven by what is technologically plausible. See BOSTROM, supra note xx, at 30-32. 
49 MICHAEL TOMASELLO, A NATURAL HISTORY OF HUMAN THINKING 90-92 (2014). 
50 For a complementary approach that does not deal with a specific area of human activity such as con-
tracting, see David J. Calverly, Imagining a Non-Biological Machine as a Legal Person, 22 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE & SOC. 523 (2008). On collective intentionality and humans, see Id. 80-123; PASCAL 
BOYER, MINDS MAKE SOCIETIES: HOW COGNITION EXPLAINS THE WORLD HUMANS CREATE 163-202 
(2018); JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 1-
27 (2013); SAMUEL BOWLES & HOWARD GINTIS, A COOPERATIVE SPECIES: HUMAN RECIPROCITY AND 
ITS EVOLUTION (2011).  
51 TOMASELLO, supra note xx at 90-92. A linkage may exist here to Scott Shapiro’s planning theory of 
law. SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 2011). 
52 BOYER, supra note xx. 
53 See infra notes xx and accompanying text.  
54 Id.; TOMASELLO, supra note xx.  
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be difficult for AGI to engage in contracting or to be subject to contract law if it cannot 
interact with humans as humans have evolved to interact and to be regulated by insti-
tutions humans have constructed to reflect the intentions humans hold in common. 
These cultural practices existed before many humans are born and yet they are subject 
to them and indeed cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally through social 
learning.55 So too something similar will have to occur or be simulated for AGI.  
Lon Fuller presaged the contemporary research in psychology and anthropology in 
a way that is relevant to the question of AGI legal agency. He states the relationship of 
human agency to the law as follows: 
To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the govern-
ance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man 
is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and 
following rules, and answerable for his defaults.56  
The question is, to Fuller, whether a person subject to the law “is, or can meaningfully 
strive to become, a responsible, self-determining center of action.”57 Reading the rele-
vant passages in Chapter 4 of Fuller’s The Morality of Law informs us that he was 
responding to the behaviorism of his time, most notably that of psychologist B.F. Skin-
ner, for whom intentionality and related aspects of cognition were black boxes not to 
be explored.58 Beyond our scope here is an exploration how Fuller’s principle of self-
determination does or does not reflect some form of intentionality. The point here is 
limited: that some “traditional” or non-naturalist legal philosophy may have something 
to tell us about who can be law’s subjects. 
Continuing on from Fuller’s responsible agent condition with a more traditional 
philosophical approach, we can examine the question of extending law’s rights and 
55 TOMASELLO, supra note xx, at 115. 
56 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 162 (2d ed., 1969). 
57 Id., 163. 
58 Id., 163-67. 
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liabilities to AGI through the lens of good old-fashioned moral philosophy about justi-
fication of the law. How might we justify the extension of the law of contract to AGIs? 
Justification of this kind involves investigating two relationships: (1) the relationship 
of the law, a social institution backed by the coercive power of the state, to bearers of 
its legal rights, duties, and obligations and (2) the relationship the law establishes be-
tween persons.59 At least from a human perspective, we can rely on a contractualist 
approach, developed by T.M. Scanlon and others:60 do humans have reasons to reject 
an AGI as having the status of a contract party, generally as a matter of principle and 
not specific to any transaction? AGIs may also deserve the same question to be an-
swered if we are amenable to a level of abstraction that permits us to consider whether 
they are responsible agents who are capable of desert, blame, and other attributes asso-
ciated with how the normative structure of the law has authority to regulate the persons 
it governs.61  
We will likely reach the same conclusion by the philosophical route that we have 
reached by the anthropological and psychological route. If we want to justify the appli-
cation of the law as it has been constructed by and for humans to AGI, then we need to 
develop AI with human-like values and dispositions – with human-like cognitive archi-
tecture or that at least simulates it with the ability to interact with humans, otherwise 
humans can reasonably reject the move. We need AI to have these qualities to be able 
to enter into and perform contracts with humans. A relationally focused cognitive ar-
chitecture for exchange relationships with humans and for AGI to be recognizable – 
59 See John Finnis, The Priority of Persons in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE FOURTH SERIES 1
(Jeremy Horder ed., 2000)(law as establishing relationship between persons); T.M. Scanlon, Promises 
and Contracts, in T.M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
234 (2003)(on the relationship of law to persons); see KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE: RECLAIMING 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON FULLER 99 (2012)(on law’s relationship to human agency as understood by 
Fuller). 
60 See Scanlon, supra note __; T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
61 See Luciano Floridi & J.W. Sanders, On the Morality of Artificial Agents, 14 MIND & MACHINE 349
(2004)(on a method of abstraction). 
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subject to or eligible for - recognition by the law, is necessary. Contract law exists to 
meet human needs in human societies for voluntary exchange. A sufficient level of 
mutuality in terms of autonomy, interaction, autonomy, and adaptability62 would seem 
to be necessary for the extension of contract rights and liabilities to AGI to survive the 
test of reasonable rejection. Otherwise cooperation with humans will fail. Worse, an 
alien system of AGI values and cognitive abilities, based on norms humans do not un-
derstand and cannot reasonably accept, may be considered by humans to be harmful or 
pernicious, or may cause harm to humans. 
What would be the properties of collective intentionality or responsible agency rel-
evant to contracting by AGI? We can make a start on answering this question here, 
though more AI research would need to be done. AGI will need to have a cognitive 
architecture of voluntary exchange, understood within a social context of cooperation 
within groups. It would not be pure self-interest as understood in rational choice theory, 
long since discredited by advances in anthropology, psychology, and economics it-
self.63 In Pascal Boyer’s words: “Humans area immensely cooperative.”64 Tomasello 
explains, based in his many years of anthropological work, that humans differ from 
other apes because we are “group-minded.”65 Humans have only recently separated 
62 John Sullins reconceptualizes moral agency for AI around three criteria: (1) autonomy in the engineer-
ing sense, which means not under control of another agent or user; (2) intentionality in a weak AI sense, 
and (3) responsibility, satisfied with appearance and putting aside metaphysics. John Sullins, When is a 
Robot a Moral Agent?, 6 INT’L REV. INFO. ETHICS 23 (2006). Floridi and Sanders develop a moral agency 
for AI around the following three criteria: (1) interactivity, which means the agent and its environment 
can act upon each other; (2) autonomy, the agent can change state without direct response to interaction, 
and (3) adaptability, meaning the agent’s interactions can change the transition rules by which it changes 
state. Floridi and Sanders add that an action qualifies as a moral if and only if it can cause moral good or 
evil. Floridi & Sanders, supra note xx. For a discussion of these and other conceptions of moral agency 
for AI, see DAVID J. GUNKEL, THE MACHINE QUESTION; CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AI, ROBOTS, AND 
ETHICS 69-73 (2017). 
63 See BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note xx; Joseph Heinrich. Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, 
Ernst Feht, Herbert Gintis, & Richard McElreath, In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experi-
ments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001); BOYER, supra note xx, at 167.  
64 BOYER, supra note xx, at 164. 
65 TOMASELLO, supra note xx, at 82-90. 
~ 21 ~ 
economic exchange from other social aspects of interaction.66 An AGI would have to 
have the cognitive architecture associated with the psychology of transacting and ex-
change, set within the broader social context of how transacting and exchange connects 
to group identification. Self-interest would have to be represented in this architecture, 
but self-interest alone will be insufficient. 
In the context of contracting and market transactions, AGI cognition will have to 
take on the first, second, and third person standpoints. It would have to recognize and 
consider in an appropriate way its own interests (first personal) and the interest of others 
on an individual-by-individual basis (second personal). It will have to be able to repre-
sent the world objectively (third personal), to possess cognitive skills to process infor-
mation about the world abstractly, as what Tomasello characterizes as “transperson-
ally,” in an agent-neutral way. 67 This third person perspective connects to the objective 
theory of contract because it includes the ability to process information beyond one’s 
own particulars. 
An AGI capable of contracting would have to have the ability to compare utilities 
at least at the level of the average human. AGIs must be able to measure respective 
utilities to be able to infer that gaining one thing is worth losing another.68 They would 
have to have cognitive capacity to represent ownership cognitively, in terms of knowing 
what it owns and what it does not own and what passage of title or ownership means. 
An AGI would have to develop free rider and cheater detection capabilities. 
Leda Cosmides has done experimental research on how humans have evolved and 
their specialized cognitive capacities to process information in the format of “benefit 
66 BOYER, supra note xx, at  
67 TOMASELLO, supra note xx, at 87-88, 116, 122, 139. 
68 BOYER, supra note xx, at 180. 
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received, cost not paid.”69 Cosmides and Tooby have researched how human cognition 
has an evolved specialization for deontic reasoning about social exchange between hu-
mans, which may be understood as a form of actually bargained for exchange between 
humans in the same social group, which can be broadly defined.70 The cognitive archi-
tecture for social exchange reliably produces cooperation for mutual benefit between 
two agents. When the mind registers a situation in the form of a conditional rule, such 
as: “if X accepts a benefit from Y, it triggers an expectation that at some point that X 
will have to confer a benefit on Y,” a social exchange relationship has been activated.71 
In these contexts, the human mind will apply deontic concepts of obligation and enti-
tlement.72  
Not all social exchanges will qualify as contracts under the law enforceable by the 
state. Moreover, market transactions themselves may differ from paradigmatic social 
exchange. But it is worth understanding social exchange because it serves as a basic 
template for transacting in goods and services.73 The point here is basic: humans have 
just this cognitive structure connecting to transacting and agreeing and hence how con-
tract law operates, and if AGIs are to participate in the social practices of contracts 
enforceable by law, they will have to share a similar cognitive structure with humans. 
Cognitive capacities associated with obligation and entitlement not only connect to 
contract formation but to contract performance. To be able to transact in a contractual 
context, an entity must have the ability to detect cheaters and free riding.74 The 
69 Id., 181-82; Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Hu-
mans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187 (1989). 
70 Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Can a General Deontic Logic Capture the Facts of Human Moral 
Reasoning? How the Mind Interprets Social Exchange Rules and Detects Cheaters, in MORAL PSYCHOL-
OGY VOL. 1: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS 53 (Walter Sinnott Arm-
strong ed., 2008). 
71 Id. 
72 Id., 73. 
73 BOYER, supra note xx, at 193-196. 
74 Id., 181-182. 
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underlying cognitive structure associated with opprobrium for cheating is as a condi-
tional rule violation.75 It is telling that accidental rule violations will not fully engage 
cheater detection cognition in humans, but international cheating certainly will.76 While 
contractual liability is strict liability, fraud or misrepresentation liability is not in the 
main legal systems of the world and usually requires some form of proof of intent to 
defraud or deceive.77 
Another set of cognitive capacities that will have relevance to contracting are those 
that relate to what is known in the psychological literature as pro-sociality.78 Prosocial 
behavior informs us that reciprocity probably has a great deal of relevance to how hu-
man contractors understand bargained for exchange and deviations from contract per-
formance requirements. 
Finally, a cognitive architecture for engaging in repeat transactions would be nec-
essary.79 This would require the ability to recognize and act upon trust, reputation, and 
tit-for-tat.80 Human cooperation in repeat transactions is a well-understood evolutionary 
stable strategy for humans. 
We cannot provide a full design specification for AGI as a contracting party here. 
This article only serves to identify some important parameters for determining what 
might be needed for an AGI to be a competent contracting party. Some questions remain 
unanswered. An important set of questions have to do with whether to code AGI for 
human biases such as loss aversion or other biases that may provide us with a more 
75 Cosmides & Tooby, supra note xx. 
76 On accidental versus willful breaches, see PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF CONTACT LAW: EMPIRICAL 
INSIGHTS FROM MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 287 (2011); Cosmides & Tooby, supra note xx, at 102, 104. 
77 See FARNSWORTH, supra note xx, at 243-45. 
78 See BOYD, supra note xx, at 167-168; NATALIE HENRICH & JOSEPH HENRICH, WHY HUMANS COOPER-
ATE; A CULTURAL AND EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION (2007); FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: 
ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES (Jo-
seph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel L. Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr & David Gintis eds., 2004). 
79 BOYD, SUPRA NOTE XX, AT XX.  
80 Id., 184,194. 
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negative framework for understanding how humans do not always act in ways that in-
crease their welfare.81 Should we program or mimic “disability” into an AGI so it will 
not be able to out-negotiate a human in the contracting sphere or have some strategic 
advantage as a result of superior cognitive abilities? As Bostrom explains in the context 
of ethics, “to the extent that ethics is a cognitive pursuit, a superintelligence could do it 
better than human thinkers.”82 Moreover, what if AGIs could someday produce other 
AGIs on their own, which could surpass human capabilities in transactional contexts? 
These are hard questions to answer about whether AGI will pose a “threat” to humanity 
and beyond our scope here. 
Of course, how an AGI would come to obtain legal rights and liabilities as a matter 
of law is a different question. It would need some form of explicit statutory or other 
legal recognition, with perhaps some built in protections such as insurance or escrow 
requirements for assets.83 These questions are about the conventional legal pragmatics 
once we have established that an AGI can qualify as a contracting party.84 Legal sys-
tems have been down this route before, with the recognition of corporate legal person-
ality. They will do it again. 
CONCLUSION 
The work of understanding the role of AI in contracting is at its very beginning 
stages. While limited domain forms of AI are currently deployed in smart contracting, 
81 This reflects an old debate in the behavioral sciences as to whether biases and heuristics decrease 
welfare or play a more positive and adaptive role. See Peter B.M. Vranas, Gigerenzer's normative cri-
tique of Kahneman and Tversky, 76 COGNITION 179 (2000). 
82 Nick Bostrom, Ethical Issues in Advanced Artificial Intelligence, https://nickbostrom.com/eth-
ics/ai.html (accessed Feb. 21, 2019).  
83 See Solum, supra note xx, at 1245 on requiring insurance, among other legal requirements. 
84 See Ngaire Naffine, Who are the Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects, 66 
MODERN L. REV. 346 (2003), which takes us to the philosopher John Dewey, The Historic Background 
of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655, 660 (1926)(“There is no general agreement regar-
gding the nature in se of the jural subject; courts and legislators do their work without such agreement, 
sometimes without any conception or theory at all regarding their nature.”); Note, What We Talk About 
When We Talk About Persons; The Language of Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (2001) 
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the potential for expanding AI engagement in contracting and commercial transactions 
will come with technological advances in AI. AGIs do not yet exist, but we must think 
now about how they will interact with humans when they do come to exist. Law is one 
of the most important normative domains for humans. If AGIs should have some form 
of legal agency in the world of commerce and exchange, law could impose a significant 
constraint on how their cognition and resulting behavior should operate in the world. 
In the context of investing AGI with the capacity to contract, contract law itself will 
face few problems in recognizing AGI as a contracting party, if AGI has the cognitive 
machinery by which to engage in contract relationships with humans. AGI will need to 
be able to interact and value in a way that is compatible to contract law’s principles. 
These principles and the values they express are human values.85 Arguments that AGI 
can have different motivations and psychologies86 than humans seem impractical unless 
we want AGIs to have their own moral and political communities segregated from hu-
man ones, an approach prone to produce inter-group conflict. While AGI may be in the 
far future now, it will be far more practical to align their cognition to contract law and 
the values it represents than to change contract law and the humans who invented it. 
Significant work remains to be done. 
85 See Harry Surden, Values Embedded in Legal Artificial Intelligence, (U. of Colorado Law Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper No. 17-17, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932333; Virginia Dignum, Responsible 
Autonomy, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INT’L JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (IJCAI-
17) 4698 (2017).
86 Cf. Bostrom, supra note xx (on moral motivations). 
